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ABSTRACT
Home health care expenditures were the fastest growing part of Medicare from 2001–2009, despite the implementation of
prospective payment. Prior research has shown that home health agencies adopted two specific strategies to take advantage
of Medicare policies: provide at least 10 therapy visits to get an enormous marginal payment and recertify patients for
additional episodes. We study whether there is heterogeneity in the adoption of those strategic behaviors between home
health agency entrants and incumbents and find that entrants were more likely to adopt strategic practice patterns than
were incumbents. We also find that for-profit incumbents mimicked one of the practice patterns following entrants in the
same market. Our findings suggest that it is important to understand the heterogeneity in providers’ behavior and how firms
interact with each other in the same market. These findings help explain the rapid rise in expenditures in the home health
care market. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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1. INTRODUCTION
During the last decade, home health care was the American Medicare-covered service that experienced the
largest percentage increase in spending. Its annual real growth rate between 2001 and 2009 was 7.8%, well
above Medicare’s annual growth rate of 3.7% during the same period. This dramatic increase in Medicare home
health spending was surprising because it occurred under the prospective payment system (PPS) for home
health services, which was introduced in October 2000 expressly to control rapidly rising expenditures.
Previous studies have found that one of the reasons for the expenditure growth was that home health agencies
strategically adjusted their practice patterns under the new payment system (MedPAC, 2010, 2011, 2012). In
particular, agencies exploited two features of the PPS. First, the non-linear pricing for therapy visits meant that
the marginal revenue of the tenth visit, roughly $2000, was almost twenty times higher than the average cost
of one therapy visit. This led to a predictable clumping at 10 therapy visits and few patients with seven to nine
visits. Second, vague guidelines gave home health agencies considerable leeway in deciding whether to renew
treating patients after the initial capitated 60-day episode was over. Therefore, agencies could easily recertify
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additional episodes of care for patients. These features of the PPS increased the profit margins of the home
health industry and attracted many new agencies to the market (MedPAC, 2010).
In this paper, we extend the research on the general response to PPS’s financial incentives to understand
how agencies’ behavior changed in markets with high rates of entry. Entrants might be more responsive to
the financial incentives than incumbents. Entrants might face lower adjustment costs because they do not
have established practice patterns yet and can readily adopt practice patterns that lead to high profits. In
contrast, incumbents might have established their own practice patterns over a long period of time and thus
find it harder to adopt new practice patterns. We also study the difference between for-profit and nonprofit
entrants. If for-profit entrants have a stronger profit motive, they are then expected to be more responsive
to incentives.
In addition, we study the interaction between entrants and incumbents. Incumbents may have been less
responsive to financial incentives because of their higher adjustment costs. However, in a market with strong
competition from entrants, incumbents might be more likely to respond by changing their practice patterns. We
predict that incumbents in a market where entrants more adroitly responded to the financial incentives will be
more likely to resemble entrants’ practice patterns.
Our empirical results suggest that entrants were more likely to adopt strategically savvy practice patterns
(i.e., targeting a 10th therapy visit each episode and recertifying an episode of care) than incumbents. This
result holds both for for-profit and nonprofit entrants. We also find that for-profit incumbents mimicked entrants
in their market for one of those two behaviors (targeting a 10th therapy visit each episode).
2. BACKGROUND
Home health agencies provide both medical and non-medical services (skilled nursing, physical therapy, occu-
pational therapy, speech therapy, home health aide, and medical social work visits) for Medicare patients in
their home. To be eligible for home health services, Medicare beneficiaries must be home-bound and have a
need for part-time (i.e., eight or fewer hours per day) or intermittent skilled care for their illnesses. A benefi-
ciary’s physician must also certify eligibility for home health care (MedPAC, 2011). About one-third of home
health episodes were preceded by a hospitalization or other post-acute care (e.g., skilled nursing home) in 2010
(MedPAC, 2013). Importantly, Medicare patients have no out-of-pocket payments for home health services.
There are neither deductibles nor copayments. Therefore, with no demand-side variation in price, it is essential
to focus on the supply-side response to policy changes.
Home health care may at first seem to play a relatively minor role in the health system because of
its relatively small spending. In 2011, home health expenditures accounted for only 3% of total Medicare
expenditures (MedPAC, 2013). However, home health care can be a close substitute for other more expensive
health services, including hospital inpatient and nursing-home care. Therefore, it can exert a significant influ-
ence on total health expenditures (Lichtenberg, 2012; Benjamin, 1993). Also, a significant number of Medicare
beneficiaries use home health services (8% of beneficiaries in 2010). Equally importantly, home health services
enable patients to live at home rather than in a nursing home, which is strongly preferred (Konetzka, Karon,
and Potter, 2012).
Medicare home health was reimbursed under the fee-for-service payment system until 1997. Home health
spending soared under this system because Medicare reimbursed the actual home health charges almost with
no limits. Many agencies also entered the market (Figure 1). Responding to the spending surge, Medicare intro-
duced the interim payment system, which made payments more restrictive. This led to plummeting spending
and bankruptcy for one-third of the agencies. Medicare then introduced the prospective payment system (PPS)
for home health services in October 2000 (MedPAC, 2012, 2013). The PPS makes a risk-adjusted fixed pay-
ment for every 60-day episode of care (MedPAC, 2010; Ackerly and Grabowski, 2014). Prospective per-episode
payments were expected to reduce unnecessary services and curb the historical trend in home health spending.
However, unintended financial incentives enabled agencies to adopt new practice patterns and increase Medi-
care reimbursement greatly (MedPAC, 2010, 2012). Specifically, agencies used the two following strategies:
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Figure 1. Medicare home health spending and number of agencies under the different payment systems. Source: Center for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (CMS) statistical supplement & CMS Provider of Services File. Notes: (1) Total spending is in 2001 real dollars. We
adjusted for inflation using Consumer Price Index (CPI). (2) Both total spending and number of agencies increased under the fee-for-
service payment system until 1997, decreased under the interim payment system between 1998 and 2000, and again increased under the
prospective payment system from 2001
(1) targeting a tenth therapy visit each episode and (2) recertifying an episode of care (MedPAC, 2010, 2011,
2012). These strategies are the focus of this paper.
First, agencies responded to a moral hazard incentive embedded in the prospective payment schedule by
strategically adjusting the number of therapy visits per episode. For the first four visits, reimbursement was
proportional to the number of visits. The reimbursement jumped a bit for the fifth visit and remained constant
through nine visits (zero marginal revenue for visits six through nine). However, the payment increased signif-
icantly for episodes with 10 visits or more—and here is where the PPS moral hazard incentive is striking. The
marginal reimbursement was zero for visits beyond the 10th (unless the patient becomes a high-cost outlier
patient). Agencies, of course, had a strong financial incentive to provide 10 visits to earn enormous marginal
revenue (MedPAC, 2010). When the PPS was proposed, people were concerned about this moral hazard incen-
tive. However, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) decided to set a high marginal benefit for
the tenth therapy visit to ensure that the CMS compensates agencies that provided expensive therapy visits for
‘sick’ patients. In particular, the CMS identified sick patients as those who received at least 10 therapy visits.
Ten was chosen because one therapy visit lasts about 48 min, and the definition of a high therapy case is one
with at least 8 hours of therapy (HCFA, 2000).
For an example of how strong these incentives are, consider the reimbursement schedule for a typical patient
who received physical therapy visits from an agency located in Ann Arbor, MI, in 2001 (Figure 2(a)). The
marginal reimbursement for the fifth visit is more than $1000, and for the 10th visit, it is more than $2,000,
which is much higher than the average cost of one physical therapy visit ($104.74 in 2001) (HCFA, 2000). The
marginal reimbursement for all other visits after the 10th (until reaching modest outlier payments after the 56th
visit) is zero.
Agencies responded to this financial incentive. There is a conspicuous peak at the 10th visit in the density
distribution of the number of therapy visits provided (Figure 2(b)). Furthermore, the peak became more pro-
nounced over time, presumably as agencies learned how to game the system. MedPAC (2012) also reported
that the number of episodes with 10 or more visits increased almost twice as fast as all other episodes. This
suggests that agencies were intentionally meeting the 10th-visit threshold. This targeting behavior continued
until 2008 when Medicare revised the reimbursement schedule for therapy visits.
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Figure 2. Medicare home health therapy visits: (a) illustrates the Medicare prospective reimbursement schedule for a patient who received
physical therapy visits from a home health agency located in Ann Arbor, MI, in 2001. Medicare would reimburse agencies for serving
each patient every 60 days. This patient’s case-mix group was C1F3S0 when the patient received fewer than 10 therapy visits, but switched
to C1F3S2 once the number of therapy visits reached 10. Because the patient’s case-mix group changed, the payment system made about
$2000 extra payments once an agency had provided a 10th therapy visit in a 2-month-long treatment period. As a result, agencies had a
strong incentive to provide at least 10 therapy visits each treatment period. Source of data in (b) is Medicare home health claims for 2001
and 2007.
There was also a large increase in marginal revenue at the fifth visit. This gave agencies an incentive to
provide at least five visits per episode. Patients who received fewer than five visits (regardless of type of visits)
became eligible for low-cost outlier payments, and the low-cost outlier payment rates are much lower than
standard prospective payment rates (MedPAC, 2014). As seen in Figure 2(b), both in 2001 and 2007, there is a
peak at the fifth visit. This peak is smaller than the peak at the 10th visit but still obvious. For simplicity, in this
paper, we focus on agencies’ targeting the 10th therapy visits only, but the same principle applies to the fifth.
Analysis about targeting the fifth visit targeting the fifth visit is available upon request.
Second, agencies were increasingly likely to recertify an episode of care for each patient, independent of
the patient’s health. The PPS allows a patient to receive an unlimited number of episodes of care, as long as
a physician recertifies the episode of care. Guidelines about recertification decisions–‘beneficiaries must need
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part-time or intermittent skilled care to treat their illnesses or injuries and must be unable to leave their homes
without considerable effort’, (MedPAC, 2011) (p.177)—are ill-defined. Furthermore, physicians often make
recertification decisions based only on information provided by the agency (MedPAC, 2011).
A recertified patient is more profitable for two reasons. Any fixed cost of learning about the patient and his
or her health care needs have already been incurred. The other reason is selection. An agency has an incentive
to recertify a more profitable patient; after 2 months, they will have information about which patients are more
profitable. The number of episodes per home health patient increased from 1.6 in 2002 to 2.0 in 2009 (MedPAC,
2012). In 2011, responding to the increasing volume of episodes of care, Medicare required physicians to have
a face-to-face encounter with a beneficiary for a complete evaluation before recertifying home health care
(MedPAC, 2011).
These features embedded in the PPS made the home health industry highly profitable. The average Medicare
home health care margins were about 17.5% between 2001 and 2011 (MedPAC, 2014), which is much higher
than the average Medicare hospital margin in 2011 (5.5%). The high profitability of the PPS combined with
low entry costs attracted many new agencies to the market (MedPAC, 2010; Polsky et al., 2014). In addition,
the market competition was relatively low initially because many agencies had exited the market between 1997
and 2000 (MedPAC, 2010).
Consistent with the organization theory predicting that for-profit firms tend to be more responsive to financial
incentives (Sloan, 2000), most of the new agencies that entered the market under the PPS were for-profit
agencies. Between 2001 and 2010, the number of for-profit agencies that entered the market (n D 5804) is
stunningly higher than the number of nonprofit entrants (n D 252) (Figure 3).
Despite the substantial financial incentives and market changes in the home health industry, only a few
studies have examined the home health care under the PPS. Both the costs to Medicare and the likelihood of
home health service use increased under the PPS (Huckfeldt et al., 2014; Choi and Davitt, 2009). The entrance
of many new agencies to the market under the PPS made many markets more competitive (Choi and Davitt,
2009; MedPAC, 2011). Service quality increased with competition, except in extremely competitive markets
where it decreased (Jung and Polsky, 2014). Certificate of Need programs for home health care lowered entry
Figure 3. Number of for-profit and nonprofit agencies between 2001 and 2010. Source: Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services
Provider of Services File. Notes: (1) We exclude government agencies due to their small number. (2) FP incumbent indicates for-profit
agencies that had entered the market prior to the PPS; FP (For-profit) entrant indicates for-profit agencies that entered the market under
the PPS; NFP (Nonprofit) incumbent indicate nonprofit agencies that had entered the market prior to the PPS; and NFP entrant indicates
nonprofit agencies that entered the market under the PPS. (3) The increase in for-profit entrants was a primary driving force behind the
drastic increase in the number of agencies between 2001 and 2010
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rates, but did not affect the overall quality of health care (Polsky et al., 2014). Hospital-affiliated agencies were
more likely to admit sicker patients who require more home health visits (David et al., 2013).
Our paper highlights home health agencies’ responsiveness to financial incentives embedded in the PPS
and particularly focuses on entry status, which has not been studied before. That is, we examine differences
in practice patterns between entrants and incumbents and changes in practice patterns by incumbents facing
competition from entrants.
We also examine how agencies’ for-profit status influenced practice patterns across entrants and incumbents.
Only a few studies have analyzed the influence of ownership status on agencies’ behaviors in the home health
industry. Patients’ length of enrollment in home health care was longer under the fee-for-service payment
system if they were served by a for-profit agency (Grabowski et al., 2009; Han et al., 2007). For-profit agencies
incurred higher expenditures, but provided worse quality of care under the PPS (Cabin et al., 2014).
3. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
The PPS provides strong incentives for home health agencies to adopt new practice patterns compared with
the fee-for-service system. The response to the PPS incentives should be greater for entrants. Their adjustment
costs are relatively low. In contrast, incumbents face relatively high adjustment costs because their employ-
ees, including nurses and physical therapists, have established practice patterns over a long period of time.
Patients and their families would also not want to experience abrupt change in agencies’ practice patterns. Thus,
incumbents are less responsive to incentive to change practice patterns than entrants.
As discussed, most home health agency entrants were for-profits. Nonprofit agencies are only a small por-
tion of entrants (4.2% in 2010), but it is worthwhile to examine whether nonprofit entrants’ practice patterns
differed from their for-profit counterparts. Nonprofits have inherently different operational goals from for-
profit agencies. For-profit agencies must distribute profits to shareholders and thus have a strong incentive
to increase profits to survive in the market (Sloan, 2000; Kessler and McClellan, 2002). For-profit agencies
are therefore expected to be more responsive to financial incentives and follow practice patterns that could
increase profits. In contrast, nonprofit agencies do not have well-defined shareholders and thus have a weaker
incentive to increase profits (Golberstein et al., 2009; Kessler and McClellan, 2002). Employees in nonprofits
tend to be more altruistic decision-makers and thus would be less responsive to financial incentives (Dug-
gan, 2000). Nonprofit agencies may maximize the quantity and quality of care instead of profits (Horwitz and
Nichols, 2009; Newhouse, 1970). On the other hand, as argued by Weisbrod (1991), nonprofit agencies also
could be solely motivated by profits. They are just for-profits in disguise that behave exactly like for-profits
regardless of their ownership status. Norton and Staiger (1994) also find that for-profit and nonprofit hospitals
are no different in their provision of charity care after adjusting for location. Nonprofit entrants could adopt
new practice patterns to the same degree as for-profit entrants might. This framework leads to the following
testable hypothesis:
H1: Entrants were more likely to adopt profit-oriented practice patterns than incumbents, and the level of
the adoption may vary depending on entrants’ ownership type.
On average, incumbents’ adoption of practice patterns leading to high profits is expected to be lower because
of their high adjustment costs. However, incumbents might also be affected by entrants in the same market.
That is, if incumbents are located in a market where entrants more adroitly responded to the financial incentives
in the PPS, the incumbents are then more likely to change their behavior facing competition from entrants.
We thus expect to see entrants influence practice patterns among neighboring incumbents, which leads to our
second hypothesis:
H2: Entrants influenced practice patterns among neighboring incumbents.
Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Health Econ. 24(Suppl. 1): 118–131 (2015)
DOI: 10.1002/hec
124 H. KIM AND E. C. NORTON
4. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
4.1. Practice patterns among entrants
To examine the first hypothesis, we compare different types of agencies in their probability of using the two
practice patterns. The dependent variable, Pr(Y), refers to the two practice patterns of our focus: (1) the likeli-
hood of providing 10–13 therapy visits and (2) the likelihood of recertification. The cut point (10–13) for the
number of therapy visits is based on the distribution of the number of therapy visits (Figure 2(b)). Given that
agencies cannot significantly change the number of therapy visits for each patient, we also restrict the sample
to episodes with 1–20 therapy visits for the regressions of the likelihood of receiving 10–13 therapy visits.
The independent variables of interest indicate agency type. We created a dummy variable that represents
whether each agency is an entrant (i.e., entered the market under the PPS) or incumbent (i.e., entered the
market prior to the PPS). We interacted this variable with each agency’s ownership type. We consider this
interaction because nonprofit entrants’ practice patterns could differ from those of for-profit entrants. Our basic
episode-level regression is shown in Equation (1).
P r.Ykijht / D ˇ0 C ˇ1EntryPPSjh C ˇ2NonProfitjht
C ˇ3EntryPPSjh  NonProfitjht C ˇ4Agencyjht C ˇ5Patientkijht
C ˇ6Seasonalityk C ˇ7HHIjt C HRRh C t C "kijht
(1)
where k, i , j , h , and t refer to episode, patient, agency, market, and year, respectively. EntryPPS is an indicator
representing whether each agency entered the market under the PPS. NonProfit refers to an indicator of each
agency’s ownership status with a value of 1 for nonprofit agencies and 0 for for-profits.
Agency represents each agency’s basic characteristics, including facility-based status (whether an agency
is facility-affiliated (e.g., hospital-nursing or skilled-nursing home-based) or free-standing–reference group),
years of operation, and number of employed nurses, physical therapists, and home health aides. Patient is a
vector of patient demographic characteristics, including age, race, gender, and Medicare Buy-In program par-
ticipation status (a proxy of being low-income given that the Medicaid program helps pay Medicare premiums
for low-income beneficiaries) (FamiliesUSA, 1999). Patient also includes each patient’s health status such
as most frequent health diagnoses, level of clinical and functional limitations, and indicators for where each
patient stayed right before the home health admission (stayed in a hospital or nursing home–reference group,
stayed home, or was referred from another home health agency). Unfortunately, we do not have sufficiently
detailed individual health status data to examine whether an agency was more likely to recertify more profitable
patients. Thus, we do not consider how a patient’s profitability affected her likelihood of being recertified. We
also control for Seasonality, an indicator variable for the first (reference group), second, third, and last quar-
ter of each year. Anecdotally, Medicare beneficiaries’ use of home health care varies depending on the season,
which may affect an agency’s behaviors.
HHI is the agency-level Herfindahl–Hirschman index, which measures the level of market competitiveness
faced by each agency. We define the HHI using the approach of Zwanziger and Melnick (1988). The formula is
a weighted average of county-level HHIs, weighted by the fraction of each agency’s patients in each county (see
Appendix (Supporting Information) for details). We also control for hospital referral region (HRR) using fixed
effects. HRRs were developed by the Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care as a measure of the local market for home
health care. The Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care divided the United States into 306 HRRs such that each HRR
contains major referral hospitals in which both major cardiovascular surgical procedures and neurosurgery are
performed (Dartmouth Atlas, 2012). Individual HRRs reflect patient admission patterns and can thus overcome
limitations of the arbitrarily use of political boundaries, such as states and counties, to define markets (Chandra
and Staiger, 2007). Although originally developed to identify a hospital market, HRR works well to define
a home health market because HRR represents the market for tertiary medical care and is closely linked to
geographic variation in health care usage. Using HRR for a home health market is also sensible because many
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home health patients have had prior hospital stays. Finally, we include year dummy variables,  , to control for
time trends in the outcome variable.
The first coefficient of interest, ˇ1, measures the difference between for-profit entrants and incumbents
in their practice patterns. We expect ˇ1 to be positive, according to H1. Another coefficient of interest, ˇ3,
measures the difference between nonprofit entrants and incumbents in their practice patterns, relative to the
difference between for-profit entrants and incumbents. We estimate separate linear probability models for
each dependent variable. In fact, all results are essentially the same when we estimate probit models instead.
However, we prefer the individual ordinary least squares regression (OLS) results because of the more straight-
forward inference with the interaction term estimates (Ai and Norton, 2003; Karaca-Mandic et al., 2012; Norton
et al., 2004). Standard errors are clustered at the HRR level.
4.2. Influence of neighboring entrants on practice patterns among incumbents
To examine our second hypothesis, we created a sample of episodes served by incumbents while excluding
episodes in HRRs with no entrants. We then evaluated how the practice patterns of entrants affected incumbents
in the same market. Identification is difficult because an individual entity’s behavior can change jointly with
an average group behavior (Manski, 1993, 2000; Gaviria and Raphael, 2001; Norton et al., 2003; Sorensen,
2006). To avoid this identification difficulty, we follow the approach of the studies that used one-period-lagged
reference group information (Pollak, 1976; Alessie and Kapteyn, 1991; Woittiez and Kapteyn, 1998). Using a
one-period lag is also justifiable because it could take time for agencies to identify profitable practice patterns
and adjust practice patterns.
We stratify the sample by agency ownership and estimate regression (2) separately for episodes served
by for-profit and nonprofit agencies because for-profit and nonprofit agencies’ responses to entrants’ practice
patterns could be different because of their different operational goals. The basic episode-level regression takes
the following form:
P r.Ykijht / D ˇ0 C ˇ1Y newfpht1 C ˇ2Y existingfpht1 C ˇ3Y newnpht1 C ˇ4Y existingnpht1
C ˇ5Agencyjht C ˇ6Patientkijht C ˇ7Seasonalityk C ˇ8HHIjt
C HRRh C t C "kijht
(2)
where Y newfp
ht1 and Y
existingfp
ht1 are the average specific practice pattern .Y / of for-profit entrants and incumbents in
HRR h in year t 1, respectively. Likewise, Y newnp
ht1 and Y
existingnp
ht1 are the proportion of specific practice pattern
of nonprofit entrants and incumbents in HRR h in year t  1, respectively.
A relatively small number of nonprofit agencies (n D 252) entered the market under the PPS. This means
that there are only a small number of episodes that occurred in HRRs that experienced entry by nonprofits in the
main analysis (e.g., only 83 out of 306 HRRs had nonprofit entrants in 2006). To avoid a substantial reduction
in sample size, we also restrict the sample to HRRs with no nonprofit entrants and run regression (3) without
controlling for the variable Y newnp
ht1 . The coefficient of interest, ˇ1 (or ˇ3), measures how much the change in
the average practice patterns among for-profit (or nonprofit) entrants in HRR-affected practice patterns among
incumbents in the same HRR. Standard errors are clustered at the HRR level.
5. DATASETS
We use 2001 to 2007 data from three sources: the CMS 5% Limited Data Set-Denominator File, the CMS 5%
Limited Data Set-Home Health Agency File, and the CMS Provider of Services File. The first dataset contains
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basic demographic information on 5% of all Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in a given year so the 7 years of
data create a panel dataset. The second dataset is a panel of 5% of Medicare beneficiaries who received home
health services and contains information on their use of those services (CMS, 2012). The third dataset is a panel
of all Medicare-certified home health agencies across the nation and includes their basic information including
location, ownership type, and date of initial Medicare certification. We combine all three datasets, creating a
patient–agency linked, unbalanced panel dataset. Each observation in this dataset corresponds to a patient’s
unique episode of care.
We limit the sample to Medicare beneficiaries who are age 65 years or older. We also drop health main-
tenance organization (HMO)-enrolled beneficiaries because Medicare HMOs were not directly influenced by
Medicare reimbursement system changes. We further exclude episodes in which home health care was inter-
rupted because a patient was transferred or discharged to another health care setting (e.g., hospital, intermediate
care facility, nursing home, and hospice), transferred to another agency, or died. We drop the few episodes
treated by government home health agencies (4.68% of all episodes in 2007). Finally, we drop episodes served
by agencies in their entry year, because the information is only for a partial year. These selection criteria cre-
ated an unbalanced panel dataset with 1,140,543 patient-episode observations on 458,754 unique patients. See
Table I for summary statistics of the main variables.
Table I. Summary statistics of outcomes and patient and facility characteristics in for-profit
and nonprofit agencies in 2007
For-profit agencies Nonprofit agencies
Mean (SD) Observations Mean (SD) Observations
Outcomes
Pr(10Therapy visit13) 0.41 56,365 0.23 40,150
Pr(Recertification) 0.52 122,580 0.29 71,990
Patient characteristics
Age (65–99) 79.47 (7.87) 63,393 79.48 (7.76) 50,273
Race
Pr(White) 0.80 63,393 0.89 50,273
Pr(Black) 0.20 63,393 0.11 50,273
Pr(Other race) 0.0015 63,393 0.0017 50,273
Pr(Female) 0.66 63,393 0.64 50,273
Pr(Buy-in participation) 0.26 63,393 0.16 50,273
Functional limitation
Pr(Min) 0.028 122,580 0.042 71,990
Pr(Low) 0.20 122,580 0.22 71,990
Pr(Mod) 0.54 122,580 0.54 71,990
Pr(High) 0.15 122,580 0.11 71,990
Pr(Max) 0.079 122,580 0.077 71,990
Agency characteristics
Pr(Facility-based) 0.031 4,870 0.52 1,738
Years of operation 9.54 (8.56) 4,870 23.09 (11.06) 1,738
No. of nurses 9.14 (65.95) 4,870 17.74 (42.00) 1,738
No. of physical therapists 2.16 (10.28) 4,870 4.42 (9.00) 1,738
No. of home health aides 5.82 (36.96) 4,870 8.03 (21.56) 1,738
Agency-level HHI 0.12 (0.12) 4,870 0.25 (0.17) 1,738
SD, standard deviation; HHI, Herfindahl–Hirschman index.
The number of observations varies depending on whether variation of each variable comes from
episode-level, patient-level, or agency-level.
‘Facility-based’ is a dummy variable indicating whether an agency is hospital-nursing or skilled-
nursing home-affiliated or free-standing.
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6. RESULTS
6.1. Practice patterns among entrants
For-profit entrants were more responsive to financial incentives embedded in the PPS than were for-profit
incumbents. As seen in Table II, column 1, a patient’s likelihood of receiving 10–13 therapy visits is higher by
6.7% if the patient receives the visits from a for-profit entrant compared with an incumbent. Given that for-profit
agencies’ average likelihood of providing 10–13 therapy visits is 41% in 2007, a 6.7% difference is relatively
substantial. The interaction term between indicators of agency ownership and entrant is insignificant, which
Table II. Practice patterns in incumbents and entrants
Covariate (1)Pr.10  Therapy visit  13/ (2)Pr(Recertification)
Agency characteristics
Nonprofit 0.0425*** 0.0340***
(vs for-profit) (0.0053) (0.0079)
Entry under PPS 0.0667*** 0.029**
(0.0099) (0.012)
Entry under PPS 0.014 0.016
 Nonprofit (0.017) (0.018)
Years of operation 0.00069*** 0.00055
(0.00019) (0.00037)
Facility-based 0.0231*** 0.0406***
(vs free-standing) (0.0044) (0.0067)
Agency-level HHI 0.023 0.213**
(0.015) (0.035)
Patient characteristics
Age 0.0087*** 0.0042**
(0.0015) (0.0020)
Age-squared 0.000052*** 0.000043***
(0.000000) (0.000013)
Race
(White)
Black 0.0230*** 0.0215***
(0.0054) (0.0054)
Others 0.0061 0.0093
(0.0148) (0.0148)
Female 0.0112*** 0.0023
(0.0015) (0.0022)
Buy-in participation 0.00140*** 0.00614***
(0.00040) (0.00042)
Functional limitation
(Min)
Low 0.0994*** 0.0330***
(0.0044) (0.0030)
Mod 0.1422*** 0.0587***
(0.0039) (0.0038)
High 0.1424*** 0.1047***
(0.0054) (0.0042)
Max 0.0812*** 0.2308***
(0.0054) (0.0064)
Observations 550,460 1,140,543
PPS, prospective payment system.
Other control variables include agency characteristics (number of nurses, physical ther-
apists, and home health aides), patient characteristics (indicators for where each patient
stayed right before the home health admission, major health conditions, and level of clin-
ical limitation), seasonality, and year and hospital referral region fixed effects.
Equations are estimated using an ordinary least-squares regression.
Standard errors shown in parenthesis are clustered on hospital referral region. In column
1, we restrict the sample to episodes that provided 1–20 therapy visits.
*p  0:1; **p  0:05; ***p  0:01.
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suggests that the discrepancy between nonprofit entrants and incumbents in their likelihood of providing 10–13
therapy visits was not statistically different from the corresponding discrepancy between for-profit entrants and
incumbents. We find the similar pattern for recertification except that the effect is smaller. For-profit entrants are
more likely to recertify another episode of care by 2.9% compared with for-profit incumbents. Given the for-
profits’ mean likelihood of recertification in 2007 (52%), the difference is relatively small but still meaningful.
This practice pattern difference between entrants and incumbents is also found among nonprofits. For the full
model estimation, please see Appendix (Supporting Information) Table I.
As a sensitivity check, we run the same set of regressions but with different outcome variables. Given that
the reimbursement significantly increased at the 10th therapy visit, providing seven to nine visits represents
relatively unprofitable practice patterns. We therefore expect to see that entrants are less likely to provide
seven to nine visits. The regression results are consistent with this prediction (see Appendix Table II, column
1). Both for-profit and nonprofit entrants’ tendency of providing seven to nine therapy visits is smaller than
their counterpart incumbents. We also run the same regression with the outcome variables with different cutoff
points: the likelihood of providing 10, 10–11, and 10–12 therapy visits. All the results are the same qualitatively,
although the magnitude of the coefficient changes slightly (see Appendix Table II, columns 2–4).
6.2. Influence of neighboring entrants on practice patterns among incumbents
We find strong effects of the influence of entrants on provision of 10–13 therapy visits among for-profit incum-
bents, but not for nonprofit incumbents. When we limit the sample to HRRs that had no nonprofit entrants,
changes in for-profit incumbents’ provision of 10–13 therapy visits is positively correlated with the changes
in for-profit entrants’ behavior in the previous year (see column 1 in Table III). This result is consistent with
our prediction. More specifically, if a for-profit incumbent is located in an HRR that experienced a 1% higher
growth in the likelihood of providing 10–13 therapy visits among for-profit entrants, then the incumbent’s like-
lihood of providing 10–13 visits increases by 4.3%. Even when we limit the sample to only HRRs that had
nonprofit entrants, there remains a positive association in providing 10–13 visits between for-profit incumbents
and entrants, but the relationship is less statistically significant than that in column 1. This might be driven by
Table III. Influence of neighboring entrants on practice patterns among incumbents
Pr(10  V T  13) Pr(Recertified)
For-profit Nonprofit For-profit Nonprofit
Covariate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
E(FP incumbent) 0.065 0.19* 0.016 0.067 0.280*** 0.372*** 0.070*** 0.152***
(0.052) (0.11) (0.033) (0.099) (0.058) (0.044) (0.025) (0.049)
E(FP entrant) 0.043*** 0.066* 0.017 0.049 0.0109 0.093** 0.011 0.114*
(0.013) (0.035) (0.011) (0.036) (0.0174) (0.037) (0.011) (0.067)
E(NFP incumbent) 0.011 0.048 0.010 0.023 0.029 0.046 0.183*** 0.039
(0.033) (0.052) (0.058) (0.112) (0.024) (0.069) (0.051) (0.110)
E(NFP entrant) 0.014 0.0034 0.028 0.018
(0.013) (0.0219) (0.020) (0.038)
Observations 112,186 32,685 98,177 21,506 249,568 78,412 193,914 42,977
We ran all regressions, separately by agency ownership type.
E(FP Incumbent) and E(FP Entrants) indicate the average specific practice pattern of for-profit entrants and incumbents in the same hos-
pital referral region (HRR) in the previous year, respectively.Likewise, E(NFP Incumbent) and E(NFP Entrants) indicate the average
specific practice pattern of nonprofit entrants and incumbents in the same HRR in the previous year, respectively.
Other control variables include patient characteristics (age, age-squared, race, gender, participation in Medicare Buy-In Program, indica-
tors for where each patient stayed right before the home health admission, major health conditions, and level of functional and clinical
limitation), agency characteristics(number of registered nurses, physical therapists, and home health aides, years of operation, and facility-
based status), Herfindahl–Hirschman Index, seasonality, and HRR and year fixed effects.
Equations are estimated using an ordinary least-squares regression.
Standard errors shown in parenthesis are clustered on HRR. In regressions of columns 1–4, we restrict the sample to episodes that pro-
vided 1–20 therapy visits.
*p  0:1; **p  0:05; ***p  0:01.
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a higher standard error because of a relatively small sample size in column 2. We do not find the same pattern
among nonprofits: there is no positive relationship in providing 10–13 visits between nonprofit entrants and
incumbents (Table III, columns 3 and 4).
There is no positive relationship in recertification between entrants and incumbents in regressions when we
limit the sample to HRRs that had no nonprofit entrants (Table III, columns 5 and 7). Interestingly, however,
once we limit the sample to HRRs that had nonprofit entrants, we find a negative relationship in recertification
between entrants and incumbent (Table III, columns 6 and 8). We also find that if the average likelihood
of recertification among for-profit incumbents in the previous year was higher, then for-profit and nonprofit
incumbents in the same market were also more likely to recertify an episode of care 1 year later.
In the original estimation specification, we excluded episodes in HRRs with no entrants because we want
to examine the influence of entrants’ practice patterns on neighboring incumbents. It could be interesting to
compare the incumbents in markets with and without entrants. We predict that the probability of recertifi-
cation and providing 10–13 therapy visits is higher for incumbents in markets with entrants compared with
incumbents in markets without entrants. This prediction turns out to be true. The average likelihood of pro-
viding 10–13 therapy visits is 0.35 and 0.26 among incumbents located in markets with and without entrants,
respectively. The corresponding values were 0.41 and 0.33 for the average likelihood of recertification. This dis-
crepancy in incumbents’ practice patterns still exists even after controlling for other factors that could influence
practice patterns.
7. DISCUSSION
Our study has produced a number of policy-relevant findings. First, we have shown that home health agen-
cies respond to financial incentives. Agencies change the number of visits and whether they recertify patients
based on these incentives. The policy implication is that we need to be careful about how we design incentives.
It is important to think through possible unintended consequences of policies like non-linear reimbursement
schedules and weakly monitored recertification. In hindsight, this conclusion may appear obvious, but at the
time CMS implemented these policies, they believed that the PPS would control future home health care
expenditures. The policies did not achieve that for predictable reasons.
Second, our findings suggest that entrants, with lower adjustment costs, were more responsive to financial
incentives of the PPS than were incumbents. Policy-makers generally are concerned with how policies will
affect those already in the market. In this case, much of the increase in total expenditures can be attributed to
entrants who were more likely to adopt the practice patterns leading to higher Medicare reimbursements. New
entry may be good for overall patient welfare, if patients can be treated better at home than in more restricted
and expensive settings. However, entry raised expenditures on home health care.
Third, entrants’ behaviors were the same by ownership type. We found that nonprofit entrants’ practice
patterns were not different from those of for-profit agencies (similar to the result by Norton and Staiger (1994)
about hospitals). Although some of the statistical insignificance in results may have been driven by the small
number of nonprofit entrants, our result is an important reminder that nonprofit providers also choose to behave
strategically.
Fourth, we found that entrants’ practice patterns affected the incumbents’ in the same market. This is another
indirect effect of the financial incentives. Financial incentives directly affected behavior of incumbents and the
number of entrants, but it also indirectly affected behavior of incumbents through the entrants’ behavior. This
result highlights that providers do not operate in a vacuum but instead in markets with other providers. To fully
understand the effects of any policy, it is important to know how the policy varies with the level of interactions
among providers.
The results should be understood in light of the limitations of the study. First, we cannot perfectly take into
account patient selection among incumbents and entrants. The models control for patients’ main diagnoses and
functional limitations but cannot control for unmeasured health status, which could be correlated with choice
of agency and therefore bias estimates. However, the bias is less of a concern for examining agencies’ target of
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10 or more therapy visits because it is hard to imagine patient health status that requires exactly 10–13 therapy
visits per episode. Another limitation is that we use a 5% sample of Medicare home health patients. When the
number of episodes per agency is small, those episodes may not be representative of the agency. In addition, our
analysis may have excluded episodes by small agencies. However, excluded agencies are likely to be entrants,
which are relatively small compared with incumbents. Given that we find entrants were more likely to adopt
strategic practice patterns, excluding those small agencies implies that our results are conservative.
8. CONCLUSION
Prior research has shown that home health agencies strategically adopted two specific practice patterns to take
advantage of Medicare policies: provide at least 10 therapy visits to get an enormous marginal payment and
recertify patients for additional episodes. We identify policy-relevant heterogeneity in the adoption of those
strategic behaviors between entrants and incumbents: entrants were more likely to strategically adopt practice
patterns than were incumbents. We also find that for-profit incumbents mimicked one of the practice patterns
following entrants in the same market. Our findings suggest that it is important to understand the heterogeneity
in providers’ behavior and how firms interact with each other in the same market. These findings help explain
the rapid rise in expenditures in the home health care market.
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